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STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT: CONTINUED ENFORCEABILITY AS
FEDERAL LAW AFTER STATE COURT
INVALIDATION ON STATE GROUNDS
INTRODUCTION

In 1970 Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments' in order
to more adequately deal with the growing problem of air pollution.2
These amendments preserve the general scheme that prior federal
legislation contained by requiring states to submit plans for approval
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that will implement
air quality standards.' The EPA Administrator must approve a state
plan if he finds that the plan and its adoption satisfy the requirements
of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended.' Once approved, the plan
becomes enforceable as both state and federal law.5 Because of this
cooperative federalism, many significant and difficult issues have arisen
in the courts.6 One such issue is whether a state implementation plan
(SIP) is enforceable if it is approved by the EPA and subsequently
invalidated by a state court on state grounds!
Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a
SIP that had been held invalid on state procedural grounds in state
court was unenforceable even though it had been approved by the
EPA.8 The effects of this decision are extremely significant and farreaching: the citizens of the state are left without an enforceable plan;
1. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
2. H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5356, 5356 [hereinafter cited as NEWS].
3. Under the Clean Air Amendments, as distinguished from prior federal
legislation, these air quality standards were set by the federal government. See infra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1982). For the requirements that the plan must
satisfy, see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 64-78, 81 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (concerning whether
state adopted plans can be more strict than the CAA requires); Train v. NRDC, 421
U.S. 60 (1975) (concerning the states' authority to revise approved plans).
7. Although this article will deal with the invalidation of an implementation
plan as a whole, the discussion which follows is fully applicable to the situation in
which only part of a plan is declared invalid.
8. Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983).
In Sierra Club, the appellant brought an action against alleged polluters to enforce
a clean air standard contained in the Indiana SIP. Id. at 1147. The standard the Sierra
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the responsibility of promulgating a new plan is placed upon the
already overburdened EPA;9 and finally, the enforceability of all other
approved plans is called into question.
This note examines the reasons for holding approved SIPs unenforceable after a state court invalidates the SIP on state grounds.
The note also questions the soundness of these reasons in light of
the impact that these decisions would have on the effectiveness of
the CAA. While the CAA is by no means clear on the issue, the development of federal authority in the field of air pollution control, the
statutory scheme of the CAA, and the congressional purpose behind
the Act all support the view that an approved SIP later invalidated
by a state court on state grounds is generally enforceable as federal
law until a new plan is submitted by the state and approved by the
EPA.
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY

Because of the exceptional growth in industry and energy consumption during World War II and thereafter, the problem of air pollution became a serious problem.10 By 1955, Congress recognized that
air pollution endangers human health and safety and damages crops,
livestock, and property." Even though the state and federal efforts

Club sought to enforce, however, had been held invalid by Indiana state courts because

the state officer presiding at the hearing regarding the standard had failed to submit
written findings to the Indiana Environmental Management Board in violation of Indiana procedural law. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint basically on the
ground that the Sierra Club sought "to enforce invalid regulations." Id. at 1148. For
the rationale of the seventh circuit's decision, see infra notes 57-61 and accompanying
text.
Several other courts have also been faced with the issue. See Illinois v. Celotex
Corp., 516 F. Supp. 716 (C.D. I1. 1981) (unenforceable); Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency
v. Pollution Control Bd., 100 111. App. 3d 735, 426 N.E.2d 1264 (3d Dist. 1981) (unenforceable). But see Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (enforceable).
While the cases relied upon in this note address the enforceability of SIPs
invalidated by state courts on state procedural grounds, the rationale of these decisions, as well as the analysis in this note, is fully applicable to a state court invalidation on state substantive grounds.
9. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR
2.1 at 15 (1980) (confirming the existence of delays in approving plans).
10. 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENT LAW 5 2.03(1), at 58, S 2.01(1), at
8-9 (1984). Prior to the first federal legislation dealing with air pollution in 1955, see
infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text, few states and localities had air pollution
control programs of any significance. Id. S 2.01(1), at 9.

5

11.

Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, 322 (1955).
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to combat air pollution began in the 1950s,12 the damage caused by
air pollution was estimated by the EPA in 1973 to exceed sixteen
billion dollars annually." Because of the need to control air pollution
and because of the magnitude of the problem, Congress responded
over the past three decades by enacting federal air pollution legislation. In order to adequately understand the congressional purpose
behind the current formulation of the CAA, the development of federal
authority in the field of air pollution control must be explored. Consideration must also be given to how this development affects the
states' authority to deal with air pollution.
Although the federal government had not been involved with
air pollution control previously," in 1955 Congress enacted the Air
Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act.s This Act
authorized federal air pollution studies and provided federal technical
assistance and grants in aid to state and local agencies for research,
training, and demonstration projects."8 At this time, the declared policy
of Congress was to "preserve and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States and local governments in controlling air
pollution."' 7 Thus, the role of the federal government was to provide
information and money to assist the states' efforts in controlling air
pollution.
In the 1960s, however, the federal government began taking a
far more active role in controlling air pollution. Congress realized that
the existing control efforts were inadequate. 8 Federal assistance alone
was simply insufficient to deal with air pollution. Congress, while still
proclaiming that the states were primarily responsible for fighting
air pollution, no longer declared that it was the states' right to control air pollution. 9 The Clean Air Act of 1963,1 together with its 1965
See infra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
Damages were estimated as follows:
$ 6.1 billion
Human health
4.9
Materials and Vegetation
5.2
Property values
$16.2 billion annually
Total
GRAD, supra note 10, S 2.01(3), at 17-19.
12.
13.

14. Id. S 2.03(1)(a), at 57.
15. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
16. Id. S 5(a)(1), at 323.
17. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, 322 (1955).
18. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 392-93; Air Quality
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 485.
19. Compare Clean Air Act of 1963. 77 Stat. 392, 393 and Air Quality Act
of 1967, 81 Stat. 485, 485 with supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
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amendments, 2' expanded federal grants and authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to publish nonmandatory air criteria.' More important, though, was the fact that the
Amendments authorized direct federal involvement, albeit in limited
areas. The Secretary of HEW was empowered to promulgate and enforce federal motor vehicle emission standards3 and was entitled in
limited circumstances to intervene and abate interstate air pollution. '
Federal authority continued to expand under the Air Quality
Act of 1967.1 The Secretary of HEW was directed to designate air
quality control regions and to issue mandatory air quality criteria for
those regions."8 Though somewhat diminished, the states' role under
the Air Quality Act was to set air quality standards satisfying the2
criteria established by HEW and then to implement those standards.
If a state failed to set adequate standards, the Secretary could issue
standards applicable to the state.28 While federal authority had
increased, the states still possessed the ultimate power to decide
whether or not they would control air pollution. The Air Quality Act
established only limited federal enforcement mechanisms,' and the
states retained wide discretion in determining both the air quality
standards and the dates for attaining them."
By 1970, it was "abundantly clear" to Congress that federal legislative efforts to fight air pollution were inadequate.3 ' State planning
and implementation under the 1967 Act had made little progress.3
Congress attributed this "regrettably slow" progress to a number of
factors including the "cumbersome and time-consuming procedues" in
the 1967 Act, inadequate funding at the federal, state, and local levels,
and the lack of skilled personnel to enforce pollution requirements."
Commentators have also suggested that federal legislation prior to
unwillingness on the
1970 failed because of both an inability and an
34
part of the states to deal with air pollution.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Pub.
Pub.
Pub.
Pub.
Pub.
Pub.

L.
L.
L.
L.
L.
L.

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

89-272,
88-206,
89-272,
88-206,
90-148,
90-148,

79 Stat. 992 (1965).
S 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. 392, 395 (1963).
S 202, 79 Stat. 992, 992-93 (1965).
S 5, 77 Stat. 392, 396 (1963).
81 Stat. 485 (1967).
S 107, 81 Stat. 485, 490 (1967).

Id, S 108(c)(1), at 492.

28. Id. S 108(c)(2).
29.
30.
31.

GRAD, supra note 10, S203(1)(a), at 62-64.
See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
NEWS, supra note 2, at 5356.

32. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
33.

NEWS, supra note 2, at 5360.

34. One of the reasons that federal legislative efforts failed prior to the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 was that air pollution is a national problem that the states
are unable to effectively deal with in the absence of national standards. Strohbehn,
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Congress responded by "taking a stick to the States"' in the
form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.1 While still adhering to
the principle that each state has the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within its borders,' the Amendments sharply increased
federal authority and responsibility and correspondingly decreased the
states' discretion in controlling air pollution." For the first time, the
states were not only required to attain specified air quality standards,
but they were required to do so within a specified period of time.39
According to the Supreme Court, the scheme created by the 1970
Amendments was intended to guarantee that specified air quality standards be met and that these standards be adequate to protect the
public health and welfare."0 Moreover, Congress expressly stated that
its purpose in enacting the 1970 Amendments was to assure that the
air throughout the country "is wholesome once again. "41
The Bases for Federal/State Relationships in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. REP.
15.074, 15,076 (1982); Butler, The "New Federalism"-CanIt Really Work in Implementing Environmental Statutes?. 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 15,095, 15,097 (1982).
However, others have recognized that not only were the states unable to handle the problem, but some were unwilling to deal with it and might actually interfere
with the federal efforts in order to benefit local industry and encourage other industry
to move into the state. Id.; Luneburg, The National Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978:
Intergovernmental Problems and Some Proposed Solutions, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 397, 399
(1978).
35. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
36. The Clean Air Act was again amended in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685 (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1399 (1977). These amendments primarily establish
requirements for areas which had not attained the national standards and requirements
to prevent the deterioration of air quality in regions that had met the standards. The
1977 amendments will not be directly involved in the discussion which follows.
Hereinafter, references and citations will be to the Clean Air Act as codified at 42
U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1982).
37. Clear Air Act S 107(a), 42 U.S.C. S 7407(a) (1982). Congress has consistently reaffirmed the policy that the states are primarily responsibile for fighting air pollution. See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text. The theoretical underpinnings
of this policy are that local decisionmakers are more likely to be aware of local concerns, that citizens have greater access to a local decisionmaker, and that local decisions are more likely to promote greater efficiency. Strohbehn, supra note 34, at 15,076;
Luneberg, supra note 34, at 404-06.
38. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
39. Id. at 64-65.
40. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873
(1976). See Clean Air Act S 109(b), 42 U.S.C. S 7409(b).
41. NEWS, supra note 2. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2.
reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1080 ("The primary and overriding
purpose of the bill remains the prevention of illness or death which is air pollution
related and protection of the public interest.").
The legislative history also clearly reveals that Congress foresaw the possibility
that facilities emitting air pollution would have to close down in order to accomplish
the statute's ultimate purpose. See S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
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The foregoing historical background reveals two equally important propositions that must be considered when dealing with the CAA
and its statutory framework. First, over the past three decades, federal
authority in the field of air pollution control has increased dramatically
while the discretion of the states has been cut back rather severely.
Second, the ultimate congressional purpose in passing the 1970 Amendments was, and still is, to protect the public health and welfare by
achieving specified federal air quality standards.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE

CAA

Administrator' 2

of the EPA to propose
The CAA requires the
and promulgate regulations prescribing national ambient air 3 quality
standards"' for air pollutants listed under section 108(a)(1).' 5 The standards are of two types: primary and secondary. Primary standards
are those which are required "to protect the public health;"'" secondary standards are those required "to protect the public welfare from
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence
of such air pollutant in the ambient air."' 7
Within nine months after the promulgation of a national ambient
air quality standard, the states are required to submit a plan to the
EPA providing for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement
of the standard. 8 The Administrator is then required to approve the
42. The functions performed by the Secretary of HEW were transferred to
the Administrator of the EPA in 1970. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, S 2(a)(3),
35 Fed. Reg. 15,623.
43. "Ambient air" is the statute's term for the outdoor air used by the general
public. Train, 421 U.S. at 65.
44. Clean Air Act 5 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a).
45. Id. S 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7408(a)(1) reads as follows:
(a)(1) For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall within 30 days
after December 31, 1970, publish, and shall from time to time thereafter
revise, a list which includes each air pollutant(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued
before December 31, 1970, but for which he plans to issue
air quality criteria under this section.
46. Id. 5 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7409(b)(1).
47. Id. S 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 7409(b)(2).
48. Id. S 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(a)(1). State legislatures generally authorize
a state agency such as a pollution control board to create the SIP. The national ambient air standards are implemented, maintained, and enforced by the authorized state
agency imposing emission limitations and other requirements on stationary sources
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state plan if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice
and hearing and that it meets the eleven criteria specified in section
110(a)(2).49 Nothing in the CAA prevents a state from submitting a
plan that is more strict than the federal air standards actually require, and the Administrator is not permitted to disapprove a plan
of pollution that will result in compliance with the national standards. The formal requirements of these plans are found in S 110(a)(2) of the CAA. See infra note 49.
49. Id S 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(a)(2) reads as follows:
(2) The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove such plan, or any portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve
such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it was adopted
after reasonable notice and hearing and that(A) except as may be provided in subparagraph W)i)
in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality standard, it provides for the attainment of
such primary standard as expeditiously as practicable but (subject to subsection (e) of this section) in no case later than
three years from the date of approval of such plan (or any
revision thereof to take account of a revised primary standard); and (ii) in the case of a plan implementing a national
secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies a
reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be
attained;
(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other
measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and
maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including,
but not limited to, transportation controls, air quality
maintenance plans, and preconstruction review of direct
sources of air pollution as provided in subparagraph (D);
(C) it includes provision for establishment and operation of appropriate devices,imethods, systems, and procedures
necessary to i) monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air quality and, (i) upon request, make such data
available to the Administrator;
(D) it includes a program to provide for the enforcement of emission limitations and regulation of the modification, construction, and operation of any stationary source, including a permit program as required in parts C and D of
this subchapter and a permit or equivalent program for any
major emitting facility, within such region as necessary to
assure Ci)that national ambient air quality standards are
achieved and maintained, and (i) a procedure, meeting the
requirements of paragraph (4), for review (prior to construction or modification) of the location of new sources to which
a standard of performance will apply;
CE) it contains adequate provisions Ci)prohibiting any
stationary source within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State of any such national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard, or (II) interfere with
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measures required to be included in the applicable implementation plan for any other State under part C of this subchapter
to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or to protect visibility, and (ii) insuring compliance with the requirements of section 7426 of this title, relating to interstate
pollution abatement;
(F) it provides (i necessary assurances that the State
will have adequate personnel, funding, and authority to carry
out such implementation plan; (ii) requirements for installation of equipment by owners or operators of stationary
sources to monitor emissions from such sources; (iii) for
periodic reports on the nature and amounts of such emissions;
(iv) that such reports shall be correlated by the State agency
with any emission limitations or standards established pursuant to this chapter, which reports shall be available at
reasonable times for public inspection; (v) for authority comparable to that in section 7603 of this title, and adequate contingency plans to implement such authority; and (vi) requirements that the State comply with the requirements respecting
State boards under section 7428 of this title;
(G)it provides, to the extent necessary and practicable,
for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standaids;
(H) it provides for revision, after public hearings, of
such plan (i) from time to time as may be necessary to take
account of revisions of such national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard or the availability of improved
or more expeditious methods of achieving such primary or
secondary standard; or (ii) except as provided in paragraph
(3)(C), whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan is substantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality primary
or secondary standard which it implements or to otherwise
comply with any additional requirements established under
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977;
(I) it provides that after June 30, 1979, no major stationary source shall be constructed or modified in any nonattainment area (as defined in section 7501(2) of this title) to
which such plan applies, if the emissions from such facility
will cause or contribute to concentrations of any pollutant
for which a national ambient air quality standard is exceeded
in such area, unless, as of the time of application for a permit
for such construction or modification, such plan meets the
requirements of part D of this subchapter (relating to nonattainment areas);
(J it meets the requirements of section 7421 of this
title (relating to consultation), section 7427 of this title (relating
to public notification), part C of this subchapter (relating to
prevention of significant deterioration of air quality and
visibility protection); and
(K) it requires the owner or operator of each major
stationary source to pay to the permitting authority as a condition of any permit required under this chapter a fee sufficient to cover-
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simply because it is more strict than necessary.' If, however, a state
fails to submit an adequate plan, the Administrator is obligated to
publish and promulgate regulations establishing a satisfactory implementation plan for the state.'
Along with an intricate array of enforcement provisions,12 the
CAA contains a specified procedure for challenging the Administrator's
actions. Under section 307(b)(1), anyone challenging the Administrator's

(i) the reasonable costs of reviewing and acting
upon any application for such a permit, and
(ii) if the owner or operator receives a permit
for such source, whether before or after August 7, 1977,
the reasonable costs (incurred after August 7, 1977) of
implementing and enforcing the terms and conditions
of any such permit (not including any court costs or
other costs associated with any enforcement action).
50. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
The issue in UnionElectric was whether claims of economic or technological infeasibility
could be raised in a S 307(b) review after the appellate period had expired. Id. at
249. The Court held that the reviewing court can consider such claims only if the
Administrator could consider them when approving or disapproving a state plan. Id.
at 256. After indicating that the CAA places a duty upon the Administrator to approve state plans that meet the stated criteria and finding that none of those criteria
included considerations of economic or technological infeasibility, the Court decided
that such claims were not appropriate for the Administrator to consider in approving
a plan or for a court to consider in reviewing the approval. Id. at 265. The Court
also concluded that state plans more stringent than federal law requires must be approved by the EPA if the minimum requirements of S 110(a)(2) are satisfied. Id. See
also supra note 49 for the text of S 110(a)(2).
51. Clean Air Act S 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(c)(1).
52. The implementation plan or its most recent revision that was approved
or promulgated by the EPA is designated the "applicable implementation plan." Id.
S 110(d), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(d).
States are permitted to revise any part of the implementation plan, and the
EPA is required to approve such revisions provided the state plan after revision comports with the requirements applicable to the initial plan formulation. Train, 421 U.S.
60 (interpreting CAA S 110(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(a)(3)(A)). See also infra note 108.
The applicable implementation plan is the plan that can be enforced under sections 113 and 304 of the CAA. See Clean Air Act SS 113. 304, 42 U.S.C. SS 7413, 7604.
Section 113 requires the Administrator of the EPA to notify any person that
he finds to be in violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation plan.
Id. S 113(a)(1). If the violation continues beyond thirty days after the notification, the
Administrator may issue an order requiring compliance or may bring a civil action
seeking an injunction or a civil penalty or both. Id. Violations committed knowingly
are subject to criminal punishment in the form of fines and imprisonment. Id. § 113(c).
Section 304 authorizes citizen suits to be brought to enforce emission limitations or standards subject to certain procedural requirements such as notice to the
Administrator, to the state in which the violation occurs, and to the alleged polluter
sixty days before commencing the action. Id. S 304(a) and (b).
For a more in-depth review of the CAA enforcement provisions, see D. CuR.
RIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS S 8 (1981).
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actions must file a petition for review in a federal court of appeals
within sixty days after notice of such action appears in the Federal
Register.' Any action with respect to which a person could have
obtained judicial review under section 307(b)(1) is precluded from
review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement of the SIP."
Recently, in these enforcement proceedings, the enforceability of SIPs
invalidated on state grounds after EPA approval has been questioned.
SIPS UNENFORCEABLE AFTER INVALIDATION ON STATE GROUNDS
Although the issues have not been raised frequently, courts have
addressed both the question of the status of an approved SIP and
the question of its enforceability if invalidated by a state court on
state procedural grounds.' The courts' decisions reveal two primary
reasons for holding such invalidated plans unenforceable under both
state and federal law. First, one court found that an approved implementation plan is enforced as state, not federal, law.' If this is the
case, undoubtedly an invalidation on state grounds renders the plan
unenforceable. Second, in Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric
Corp.,5" the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that if a state
submits regulations in a SIP which were invalid when adopted, the
approval by the EPA is of no effect because it is as if the state never
submitted the regulation." Thus, an applicable implementation plan
was never created.
The seventh circuit based its decision on two additional
arguments as well. The court relied upon decisions in several other
circuits to conclude that there is a meaningful role for state court
review of SIPs under the CAA.59 The seventh circuit felt that state
court review would be meaningless if the SIP was still enforceable
53. CAA S 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7607(b)(1).
54. Id. § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 7607(b)(2). With respect to the constitutionality
of this provision, see infra note 79.
55. Many states impose both substantive and procedural limitations on the
authority delegated to their own state agencies to combat air and water pollution.
See Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 27 (1981). These limitations
sometimes give rise to litigation which results in the invalidation of part or all of
an approved state plan. See, e.g., Indiana Envtl. Management Bd. v. Indiana-Kentucky
Elec. Corp., 181 Ind. App. 570, 393 N.E.2d 213 (2d Dist. 1979) (finding part of the Indiana
implementation plan invalid under state law because of a failure by a state officer
to comply with Indiana procedural requirements).
56. Luckie v. Gorsuch, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,406 (D. Ariz. 1983).
57. 716 F.2d 1145 (1983).
58. Id. at 1148.
59. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 814 (9th Cir.
1980) ("State law must provide the remedy petitioners seek."). See also Ohio Envtl.
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as federal law after invalidation by a state court on state grounds."
The court also thought that the CAA's legislative history indicates
Congress intended the EPA to remedy any problem with a SIP, and
therefore, the EPA must act if a plan is invalidated on state grounds. 1
Though the CAA is not explicit, the conclusion that an approved
SIP is purely state law contradicts the implications of the statute."
In addition, while the arguments of the seventh circuit certainly have
merit, the weight given to these arguments is too great. The decision
ultimately reached could undermine the effectiveness of and the purposes behind the CAA.1 But before considering in detail the seventh
circuit's decision that an enforceable SIP must have valid state law
underlying it, the issue regarding the status of an approved SIP must
be resolved.
APPROVED SIP As FEDERAL LAW

Some commentators addressing the issue have concluded that
EPA approval of a state submitted plan constitutes federal rulemaking
and therefore creates federal law." Section 3071 of CAA supports this
Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24, 28-29 (6th Cir. 1979) (criticizing the failure to take state
procedural challenges to state court); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846,
854-55 (4th Cir. 1978) (similar criticism).
60. Sierra Club, 716 F.2d at 1149-53. The seventh circuit did not consider the
possibility that meaningful state court review can be accomplished without holding
the plan unenforceable at the moment the state court decision is rendered. The plan
could be changed subject to EPA approval or simply re-adopted in accordance with
state law by the state agency pursuant to an order of the court. This scheme would
not leave the state without enforceable provisions in the interim while the plan is
reformulated. Likewise, this scheme would not impose an unnecessary duty upon the
EPA. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
61. Sierra Club, 716 F.2d at 1153-54. The court relies upon S 110(c) of the
CAA and the legislative history of the statute which clearly shows Congress intended
the EPA to act if the state fails to act. Id. The court then states:
Thus, while the Congress did not explicitly foresee the possibility
of a successful state court challenge after an implementation plan was
approved by EPA, it did rather clearly embrace the general proposition
that federal action was intended to remedy any problem with a state implementation plan.
Id. at 1154 (emphasis in original). The real issue, though, is whether any problem actually exists in the plan that requires EPA action. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1059, 1078-79 (1981); Luneberg, FederalStateInteractionUnder the CleanAir Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 637, 640 (1973).
65. 42 U.S.C. S 7607.
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view by requiring notice of an approval to appear in the Federal
Register. More than a simple statement of approval appears in the
Federal Register, however; the entire plan is specified."5 Because the
Federal Register must be judicially noticed,"1 the plans appear to be
federal regulations. Nevertheless, because approval is not necessarily
the equivalent of adoption," it can be argued that the publication
merely recites the Administrator's approval of the state plan rather
than converting the state law into federal law."9
On the other hand, there is persuasive evidence contained in the
CAA which indicates that Congress intended approved plans to be
considered federal law. Revisions of implementation plans are
authorized in section 110(a)(3)(A), 7° but as the Supreme Court stated
in Trainv. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. ,71a revision is not
effective until approved by both the state and the EPA." If an approved plan were merely state law, then a revision granted by a state
would take effect immediately whether or not the EPA subsequently
approved it. Because this analysis rests on a judicial interpretation
of the CAA, however, it is not entirely fair to say that the revision
authority indicates a congressional intention to make an approved plan
federal law.
Instead, the strongest evidence from the Act that an approved
SIP becomes federal law can be found in the citizen suit provision."
66. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. S 52 from 1973 through 1983. The plans are incorporated

by reference into the Federal Register when the formal requirements of 1 C.F.R.
S 51 are met. They are treated then as if they had been published in full in the Federal
Register. 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(1) (1982).
67. 44 U.S.C. S 1507 (1982).
68. "Approve. To be satisfied with; to confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent
to some act or thing done by another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 94 (5th ed. 1979).

"Adopt. To accept, appropriate, choose, or select. To make that one's own (property or act) which was not so originally." Id. at 45.
Thus, using the above definitions, approval could be an indication of mere

satisfaction with a state plan that meets the federal requirements without any intention on the part of Congress to make the state plan into a federal plan.
69. A plan originally promulgated by the EPA, of course, has the status of
federal law. See, e.g., Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 291 (1976) ("The pro-

mulgation of rules and regulations in the C.F.R. has the full force and effect of law.").
70.
71.
72.
73.

42 U.S.C. S 7410(a(3)(A).
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
See infra note 108.
Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. S 7604(a) reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person

may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1)against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii)any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/4
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On its face, section 3041" purports to grant jurisdiction to the federal

district courts without regard to the citizenship of the parties."8 Howthe extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
standard or limitation;
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged
a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator; or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or
constructs any new or modified major emitting facility without
a permit required under part C of subchapter I of this chapter
(relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or part
D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment)
or who is alleged to be in violation of any condition of such
permit.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission standard of limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be.
The term "emission standard or limitation under this chapter" is defined in Clean
Air Act S 304(f), 42 U.S.C. S 7604(f) as follows:
(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission
limitation, standard of performance or emission standard,
(2) a control or prohibition respecting a motor vehicle
fuel or fuel additive, or
(3) any condition or requirement of a permit under part
C of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to significant
deterioration of air quality) or part D of subchapter I of this
chapter (relating to nonattainment), any condition or requirement of section 7413(d) of this title (relating to certain enforcement orders), section 7419 of this title (relating to
primary nonferrous smelter orders), any condition or requirement under an applicable implementation plan relating to
transportation control measures, air quality maintenance
plans, vehicle inspection and maintenance programs or vapor
recovery requirements, section 7545(e) and (f) of this title
(relating to fuels and fuel additives), section 7491 of this title
(relating to visibility protection), any condition or requirement
under part B of subehapter I of this chapter (relating to ozone
protection), or any requirement under section 7411 or 7412
of this title (without regard to whether such requirement is
expressed as an emission standard or otherwise)
which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable
by reason of section 7418 of this title) or under an applicable implementation plan.
74. 42 U.S.C. S 7604.
75. Id. S 7604(a).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985

890

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 4

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

ever, a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts which
is not based on the citizenship of the parties can only include cases
arising under the Constitution, laws of the United States, and treaties
made under their authority." Therefore, the citizen suit provision is
either unconstitutional with respect to suits where there is no diversity between the parties, or it reflects a congressional view that an
approved implementation plan is federal law. When faced with a conflict of this type, the Supreme Court consistently reiterates the duty
of the court to adopt the construction which saves the act."' The citizen
suit provision indicates that Congress assumed an applicable implementation plan to be federal law." But this analysis still leaves two important questions remaining to be answered. First, assuming that Congress did not condition the existence of federal law on the validity
of the state law contained in the SIP, under what circumstances and
to what extent does the CAA create enforceable federal law? Second,
is such an assumption well founded?
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE PLAN As FEDERAL LAW

While still subject to both constitutional79 and statu76. Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637
1), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1981) (relying on U.S. CONST. Art. III, S 2, cl.
836 (1981).
77. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1931); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929); Richmond Screw Anchor
Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148
(1927); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1926); Panama R.R. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924).
78. Cf. CURRIE,supra note 52, at S 8.13 ("Once a plan is federally approved, it
becomes federal law .. ").
79. Commerce clause challenges to the CAA have been rejected by the courts
without any difficulty. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139 (D.C. Cir.
1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974); Pennsylvania
v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 1974).
The CAA has also been upheld when challenged on the grounds that Congress
has improperly delegated authority to the EPA. See South Terminal Corp., 504 F.2d
at 676-77.
The argument that the CAA as a whole violates the Tenth Amendment would
likewise fail. Under the CAA, if a state fails to submit an adequate plan the duty
falls upon the EPA to create and enforce a plan for the state. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text. Thus, the states are not directly compelled to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program. This kind of statutory scheme, known as "cooperative
federalism," has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
A more difficult constitutional issue arises, however, when dealing with the
Act from a due process standpoint, since section 307(b) limits judicial review of SIPs.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Here, the question arises whether notice
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tory" challenges, an approved SIP can be enforced as both state' and
federal law." Assuming for the moment that Congress did not condition the existence of federal law on the validity of state law, then
a state plan invalidated on state grounds remains enforceable federal
law." Nevertheless, a limitation may exist with respect to the degree
to which compliance can be mandated under such a plan. This limitation is based on the statutory requirements of the CAA itself. Because
the CAA allows states to submit implementation plans more strict
than the federal standards require and because the Administrator must
approve these plans," the federal law that exists after the state law
beneath the plan is declared invalid is itself more strict than the
federal standards demand. Although states are authorized to adopt
overly strict plans," nothing in the CAA authorizes the EPA to do
so." Therefore, in this situation, the federal plan can be viewed as
in the Federal Register and a review period limited to sixty days comply with the
due process requirements that the procedures afford a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and present evidence. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944). A similar
scheme under the Emergency Price Control Act was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Yakus. For the view that the CAA review procedures are constitutional, see Luneburg
& Roselle, Judicial Review Under The Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 15 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 667,679-84 (1974). But cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S.
275, 289 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing doubts as to constitutionality of
section 307(b)(2)). See generally CURIE, supranote 52, at S 9.15 (recommending that time
limit of section 307(b)(1) be repealed).
80. Statutory challenges would focus on whether the Administrator's approval
complied with the procedural and substantive requirements of CAA. These issues could
be raised in a section 307(b) review. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. If section 307(b) is constitutional, the Administrator's approval would not be subject to review
in an enforcement proceeding. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
81. Clean Air Act S 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7410(a)(1).
82. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
83. The argument that this construction of the Act would in effect constitute
an improper delegation of authority to the states is apparently foreclosed by United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). In Sharpnack, the Court held the Assimilative
Crimes Act constitutional insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently enacted criminal law by the state in which the enclave is located. The Court
disposed of the improper delegation argument by considering the Act as a deliberate
continuing adoption of state laws by Congress. An improper delegation argument with
respect to the states is even weaker under the CAA insofar as the state law does
not become federalized until approved by the EPA.
84. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. If the Administrator imposes emission controls more stringent than
necessary to assure compliance with the air quality standards, he has exceeded his
statutory authority. CURRIE, supra note 52, at S 4.13. Accord Pedersen, supra note 64,
at 1086; Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement
Against Stationary Sources, 89 HARV. L. REv. 316, 350-51 (1975); Luneburg, supra note
64, at 659 n.94. See also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1164
n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) (upholding a federal pollution control regulation and commenting
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exceeding the statutory authority conferred on the EPA by Congress
to the extent it requires compliance with standards stricter than the
CAA mandates. Because a challenge to the Administrator's approval
of an overly strict implementation plan cannot be made in a section
307(b) review," the alleged polluter should be allowed to challenge
the federal requirements in the enforcement proceeding." Only to the
extent that the plan requires more of the alleged polluter than the
CAA demands should the plan be held ineffective.89 Except for this
limited exception, the plan should be fully applicable. After having
considered the extent to which an approved SIP can be enforced as
federal law after invalidation on state grounds assuming that Congress did not condition the existence of federal law on the validity
of the SIP as state law, the preeminent issue now becomes whether
such an assumption is well founded.
EXISTENCE OF FEDERAL LAW NOT CONDITIONED
ON THE VALIDITY OF STATE LAW

Some writers addressed the issue regarding the necessity of having valid state law contained in the SIP in order to create a SIP that
has the status of federal law by looking to section 110(a)(2)(F)} of the
CAA.' Because this section requires a submitted SIP to provide
"6necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel,
funding, and authority to carry out such implementation plan,"92 the
argument is that all issues of federal and state law regarding the

that the goal of the regulation is to attain the national standards, not to exceed them),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
87. See supra note 50.
88. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.

89. Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory authority are of no
effect. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 410 (1917). In the case of an overly strict implementation plan, though, the Administrator has not exceeded his authority in approving

it because he was required to do so under the statute. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. However, when the state law supporting the overly strict plan is
invalidated, federal enforcement of the overly strict requirement would be in effect
allowing the EPA to exceed the statutory authority that Congress conferred.
90. See supra note 49 for text of section 110(a)(2){F).
91. Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 79, at 687-92; Comment, Illinois v. Celotez
Corp., 13 ENVTL. L. 279 (1982).
92. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a}(2)(F). To implement the statutory requirement, 40 C.F.R. S 51.11 (1982) provides in part:
(a) Each plan shall show that the State has legal authority to carry
out the plan, including authority to:

(1) Adopt emission standards and limitations and any
other measures necessary for attainment and maintenance
of national standards.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/4
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validity of the plan are appropriate for resolution in a section 307(b)
review, since if the plan is invalid under state law, the state has no
authority to implement it. If no challenge is made wihtin the sixty
day time limit or if a timely challenge fails, then these federal and
state law issues could not be raised in an enforcement proceeding."
This argument, however, overlooks a major restriction regarding
the scope of review in a section 307(b) proceeding. The issue before
the court of appeals when reviewing the Administrator's approval is
not whether the state law in the plan is valid, but whether the Administrator's approval is arbitrary and capricious regarding the
authority the state has to carry out the plan.' Therefore, the failure
to challenge the Administrator's approval in a section 307(b) review
does not preclude a challenge on state law grounds in an, enforcement
proceeding. Moreover, nothing in the CAA prevents a state court from
invalidating the state law comprising the SIP prior to enforcement.9 5
In cases where these situations occur, the issue that must be decided
in the enforcement action is whether Congress conditioned the existence of the federal law on the validity of the state law underlying
the plan.
Nowhere in the CAA does Congress expressly indicate that the
creation of federal law through the Administrator's approval of an
implementation plan depends upon the validity of the state law comprising the plan." Thus, the consequences of such a restriction on the

(2) Enforce applicable laws, regulations, and standards
and seek injunctive relief.
Because of these requirements, appellate courts in section 307(b) reviews have considered whether the state has adequate legal authority to implement the plan. See,
e.g.. Ohio Envtl. Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979) (considering whether appropriate state procedures were followed); NRDC v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973)
(considering whether state law provides adequate procedures for reviewing new sources);
NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973) (considering whether the state has legal
authority to compel public disclosure of emission data). While this type of review may
serve to identify some plans that are inadequate under state law and thus help to
prevent the problem faced by the seventh circuit in Sierra Club, it does not dispose
of the issue regarding the enforceability of an approved plan subsequently held invalid on state grounds. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
94. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A); Luneburg, supra note
34, at 407 n.52.
95. See Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 79, at 691.
96. The pertinent provisions of the CAA dealing with the creation of federal
law through the Administrator's approval are sections 110(a)(2) and (d). See supra notes
49, 52 and accompanying text. The Administrator's approval is not conditioned upon
the SIP's validity as state law. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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existence of federal law must be examined in light of the CAA and
its legislative history to determine whether a congressional intention
to impose such a restriction can be inferred."
If the existence of federal law depends on the validity of state
law, then when an approved SIP is invalidated on state grounds, there
are no enforceable requirements remaining. This invalidation may
occur years after the Administrator's approval. 8 The ultimate effect
of this invalidation would be to give an unfair competitive advantage
to the polluter who did nothing and violated the plan while imposing
a corresponding detriment on those who relied upon the plan and
satisfied its requirements.9 Not only would this result be unfair, but
it could conceivably discourage polluters from trying to comply with
the CAA because litigation, even with its inherent risks, may offer
a comparative advantage over the costs of compliance.'" This fundamental unfairness and its consequential discouragement counsel against
a congressional limitation on the federal law.'0'
97.

When construing a statute, the appropriate method

" . ..

is to look to

the 'common sense' of the statute or regulation, to its purpose, to the practical consequences of the suggested interpretations, and to the agency's own interpretation for
what light each inquiry might shed." New York State Comm'n on Cable Television
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 571 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1978).
98. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 25 Ill. App.
3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (1st Dist. 1974) (invalidating a pollution control rule two years
after adoption), rev'd on other grounds, 62 111. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1976); Indiana
Envtl. Management Bd. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 181 Ind. App. 570, 393 N.E.2d
213 (2d Dist. 1979) (affirming the invalidation of a pollution control regulation adopted
in 1972).
99. One of the reasons that Congress included in the CAA section 307(b), which
restricts review of the Administrator's actions to the courts of appeal within a sixty
day period following the action, was to prevent artificial competitive advantages that
would result if district courts in a state gave differing decisions regarding the validity
of the Agency's action. See Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 79, at 675. Because Congress was concerned with preventing artificial competitive advantages, it seems unlikely
that Congress would have intended the states to have the ability to create similar
competitive advantages by invalidating a state plan years after its adoption.
100. Without the section 307(b) restriction on judicial review of the Administrator's actions, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. "many polluters
would be encouraged to wait until federal or state enforcement was initiated or imminent and then attack the validity of the applicable regulations on substantive and/or
procedural grounds." Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 79, at 675. Identically, polluters
would be encouraged to delay compliance and challenge the SIP just prior to enforcement if invalidation of the SIP on state grounds precludes enforcement.
101. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973). In InternationalHarvester,the decision made by the Administrator of the EPA
to deny petitioners' applications for a one-year suspension of 1975 emission standards
for light-duty vehicles was challenged. Id. at 622. In holding that the case must be

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/4

Buche: State Implementation Plans Under the Clean Air Act: Continued En
19851

CLEAN AIR ACT

Another factor to consider in trying to determine the congressional intent is the effect that such a limitation of federal law would
have on the EPA."'2 In the context of an approved SIP subsequently
invalidated on state grounds, the state would be given the first opportunity to replace the plan. If the state failed to do so, the Administrator would be obligated to promulgate a plan for the state." 3
Considering the fact that the original purpose in allowing the states
to adopt their own plans was to permit the accommodation of local
concerns"1' and the fact that a viable plan is available for use by the
Administrator as a model, a high probability exists that a plan promulgated by the Administrator would closely resemble or be identical to the original plan. The irony of the situation is that, with the
possible exception of some additional procedures,' the Administrator
would be required to send the plan through the same administrative
remanded for further proceedings, the court, at least in part, relied upon the competitive disadvantages that might fall upon vehicle manufacturers that had accomplished
the most toward meeting the standards if the standards were made less stringent
just prior to their applicability in order to accommodate the manufacturers that had
not made similar accomplishments. Id. at 637-38.
102. See supra note 97.
103. This is the solution advocated by the seventh circuit in Sierra Club for
the problem of an approved plan subsequently invalidated on state grounds. Sierra
Club, 716 F.2d at 1153-54. The court relied upon section 110(c)(1) of the CAA which
provides:
(c)(1) The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing record, promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting
forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if(A) the State fails to submit an implementation plan
which meets the requirements of this section,
(B)the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such
State is determined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements of this section, or
(C) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by
the Administrator or such longer period as he may prescribe,
to revise an implementation plan as required pursuant to a
provision of its plan referred to in subsection (a)(2)(H) of this
section.
The seventh circuit felt section 110(cl(1XA) was applicable. The difficulty with this reasoning is the fact that the state submitted a plan which met the requirements of section
110; otherwise it would not have been approved by the Administrator and sustained
in a section 307(b) review. Cf. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th
Cir. 1975).
104. See supra note 37.
105. The Clean Air Act S 307(d), 42 U.S.C. S 7607(d) provides specific procedures
for certain agency action, including the promulgation or revision of an implementation
plan. This section explicitly provides that sections 553 through 557 (informal rulemaking and adjudication procedures) and section 706 (judicial review) of the APA shall
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procedures used in the initial approval process to resurrect even the
identical plan. Although an implementation plan would result from
this process, the plan would be obtained at the expense of an unnecessary delay in enforcing air pollution controls and at the expense
of an unjustifiable use of administrative time and resources.' 8
A third factor that must be taken into account in this search
for congressional intent is the interpretation the EPA has given to
the Act."' Since Congress has placed the responsibility for enforcing
the Act on the EPA, the Agency's determinations on basic questions
of administration have traditionally been accorded great deference by
the federal courts unless clearly erroneous.' Even though the EPA
has not retained its original position,"9 the Agency now appears to
conclude that an approved SIP subsequently invalidated on state
grounds remains fully enforceable unless the state or EPA revises
it in accord with the process set forth in the CAA."' This interpretation is not clearly erroneous; it is both reasonable and consistent with
not apply to the agency actions delineated in section 307(d) unless expressly provided
in section 307(d). Id. 5 307(d)(1). Section 307(d), however, does not apply to the approval or disapproval of state implementation plans. See H.R. REP. No. 95-564, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 177, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1558.
106. Comment, supra note 91, at 283-84.
107. See supra note 97.
108. Ohio Envtl. Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24, 31 (6th Cir. 1979) (relying on
Train). In Train, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state could grant
individual variances from generally applicable plan provisions under the revision authority of section 110(a)(3). The EPA took the position that a state was permitted to grant
such variances as long as the variance does not cause the plan as a whole to fail to
comply with the general requirements for an original plan under section 110(a)(2). The
Court held that the Agency's interpretation of the Act was sufficiently reasonable
that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts. Train, 421 U.S. at 75.
The Court also indicated that the revisions are not effective until approved by both
the state and the Agency. Id. at 92. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S.
Ct. 2778, 2793-94 (1984) (holding in accordance with EPA's permissible construction
of the statute); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) ("We have previously
accorded great deference to the Administrator's construction of the Clean Air Act.").
109. The original EPA position was as follows:
As the EPA concedes, if "part of a state implementation plan is
held invalid by a state court, the state would have to revise that part.
Should the state fail to do so, the Administrator must propose and promulgate a revision .... In either case, a hearing, or a least an opportunity
for a hearing, is a prerequisite to adoption of the new regulation."
Brief for Respondents, Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 847 (7th Cir.
1975).
The fact that the EPA changes its position from time to time does not lead
to the conclusion that no deference is to be accorded to the Agency's present position.
Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2792.
110. After the Illinois courts invalidated a pollution control rule in 1976 in
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the statute,"' its history,"' and its objectives."' Thus, the interpretation is entitled to great deference by the courts.
Finally, the most important consideration in attempting to ascertain Congress' intention is the effect that a federal law's dependency
on valid state law would have on the effectiveness of the CAA.'" The
overriding congressional purpose for enacting the CAA was to ensure
that the health and welfare of the public would be protected." 5 If the
existence of federal law is conditioned on the validity of the state

law, the congressional purpose would be partially undermined by the
delay and unfairness that would result."$ However, even more devastating to the congressional purpose is the ability of the states to completely undermine the CAA if they wished to do so."7 A state could
accomplish this by submitting an implementation plan which appears
on its face to be valid under the existing state law, and then later,
prior to enforcement, holding the plan invalid because of some procedural or substantive technicality. When told by the EPA to submit
a new plan or revise the invalid one, the state could begin the same
process anew." 8 Neither the EPA nor the citizens of a state would

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 25 Ill. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d
84 (1st Dist. 1974). the Regional Administrator issued a Notice of Deficiency which
expressly stated that "all of the current applicable implementation plan remains in
effect until the plan revision is submitted by the state to the EPA and is approved
by EPA or until EPA promulgates substitutes or additional regulations." 41 Fed. Reg.
32,304 (Aug. 2, 1976). When the reissued rule was invalidated again in Ashland Chem.
Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 Ill. App. 3d 169, 381 N.E.2d 56 (3d Dist. 1978), the
Regional Administrator issued a second Notice of Deficiency requesting another revision. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,724 (July 12, 1979). A request for a revision implies that the
approved plan is still in effect because revisions do not alter the underlying plan until
approved by the EPA. See supra note 108. While the second notice seemed to imply
that the plan actually lacked certain enforceable provisions, it can be read as simply
offering the state the opportunity to revise the plan with respect to its status as
federal law.
111. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 10-41 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
114. "As in all cases of statutory construction. our task is to interpret the
words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1971).
115. See supra note 41.
116. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
118. This undermining of the Act could be accomplished because the Administrator is not allowed to promulgate a plan or revision for a state if the state
adopts and submits a plan which the Administrator finds to be in accordance with
section 110 prior to the Agency's promulgation. Clean Air Act S 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.
S 7410(c)(1).
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ever be entirely sure the implementation plan was effectively in
place."' To conclude that Congress intended that the enforceability
of a federally approved implementation plan rested upon the validity
of state law leads one to the absurd result that a state could undermine the overriding congressional purpose of the CAA. Moreover, this
result is out of harmony with the development of federal authority
in the field of air pollution control and the corresponding congressional
intention to eliminate the states' discretion in determining whether
air pollution would be controlled."' Because of the fundamental unfairness, the unnecessary delay and dissipation of administrative
resources, the inconsistency with the Agency's construction of the
statute, and the potential undermining of the CAA, one cannot fairly
infer a congressional intention that an approved plan's status as federal
law depends on the validity of the underlying state law.
CONCLUSION

A state submitted implementation plan becomes enforceable as
federal law upon approval by the Administrator of the EPA. A subsequent invalidation on state grounds should not be held to preclude
enforcement of the plan as federal law, except to the extent the plan
demands more than the CAA itself actually requires. If enforcement
is denied on the grounds that the federal law depends upon valid state
law, then many diverse and counter-productive results occur. One extremely unsatisfactory result is the potential for a state to undermine the CAA. Admittedly, the CAA has its shortcomings,' but
unless and until Congress amends the Act to clarify it, the courts
must interpret it in a manner which enhances its effectiveness rather
than in a way which undermines its existence.
CRAIG MICHAEL BUCHE
119.

This argument was presented to the seventh circuit in Sierra Club.

Acknowledging that the decision was "in some ways a setback to environmental protection," the court did not agree that it would be years before Indiana had a workable

implementation plan. Sierra Club, 716 F.2d at 1154 (suggesting that the EPA propose
and promulgate the invalidated regulation after notice, comment, and hearing). The
court apparently did not consider the possibility that a state could undermine the
CAA because of the court's ruling. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 1041 and accompanying text. See also CuRRIE, supra note
52, at S 8.10 (when referring to Commonwealth Edison, Currie states, "One district
court has held with considerable justification that a plan requirement may be enforced
under the citizen suit provision of S 304 even after a state court has held it invalid
as a matter of state law."); Pedersen, supra note 64, at 1084 ("The position that the
SIP remains federally binding is probably the only one that is consistent with a rapid
national effort to place major new controls on air pollution through SIPs.").
121. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean
Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983); Pederson, supra note 64.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/4

